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Introduction
The longstanding academic debate over the role of developing country trade in the deindustrialization of the developed world was rekindled in the 1990s as developing country penetration of OECD markets reached historic levels. On one side of the debate were those who claimed the unimportance of North-South trade for industrial country manufacturing employment (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1997 , Krugman, 1996 , Krugman and Lawrence, 1996 . On the other side were those who claimed that North-South trade had significantly contributed to developed country deindustrialization (Saeger, 1997 , Wood, 1994 , Sachs and Shatz, 1994 . In this paper we use factor content analysis to study the employment effects of trade for ten OECD countries from 1978-1995. We find that for these ten OECD countries, the growth in trade of manufactures from 1978-1995 had a negative net effect on manufacturing employment of about 3.3 million jobs (measured in worker years), 2.0 million of these in the United States alone. The U.S. figure is considerably higher than that found in Sachs and Shatz (1994) for the period [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . When we break this employment loss out between OECD and non-OECD trade, we find that OECD trade in fact brought a slight gain in manufacturing employment (about 55,000 worker years) overall for the ten countries in our sample and that non-OECD trade accounted for a loss of 3.4 million jobs for these countries over the period, or about 5 per cent of total manufacturing employment in 1978.
As we enter the final years of the implementation of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement, with many of its tariff reductions back-ended for the 2002-2004 period (for example in textiles and apparel) the rate of import penetration from developing countries is likely to rise even further. While these changing trade patterns are a very positive development for many developing countries, the job losses they imply are likely to be an important policy issue for developed countries, especially as this period of trade liberalization coincides with a global slowdown in economic growth.
Factor content calculations do not tell the whole story, and this paper does not attempt to address the question of the relative importance of the different causes of "deindustrialization". 1 Even with respect to trade, it is important to look beyond the factor content calculations. NorthNorth trade accounted for 71 per cent of total trade among our sample of countries as of 1995, with the measure showing no clear trend going back to 1970. And while the growth of manufacturing import penetration from developing countries has been impressive, the absolute level it attained by 1995 was below 7 per cent, and in most cases less than 4 per cent (see Table 1 ). This compared to import penetration by other OECD countries of 66.5 per cent in the Netherlands, 49.3 per cent in Denmark, 46.3 per cent in Canada and 33.0 per cent in the U.K. Thus we find that the rate of deindustrialization is more highly correlated with the employment effect of trade among OECD countries rather than with trade with non-OECD countries.
Still, the factor content calculations do paint an interesting picture. Trade among OECD countries is a largely a zero-sum game, as gains by some countries offset losses by others. Trade with non-OECD countries had a negative employment effect compared to the counterfactual level of trade for every country in this study. These results are robust with respect to adjustments (in technical and labour coefficients) that account for technical change over the period. At the industry level we find that employment changes were greatest in the most labour-intensive industries, and that labour-intensive industries are more adversely affected by trade with non-OECD than with OECD countries. This paper contains five sections. In section 2 we assess the main sources of international competition facing the OECD countries. Section 3 gives the results of the calculation of the employment effects of trade. In section 4 we turn to the question of deindustrialization, focussing on the role of trade in the decline in the manufacturing share of employment in the OECD. In section 5 we conclude with a discussion of what we can and cannot learn from factor content analysis.
2.
Trade expansion and the structure of production
The employment effects of trade are measured as the labour content embodied in the change in manufacturing imports and exports over the period, that is, in the change in the "trade structure". Following Sachs and Schatz (1994, p. 28) 2 , we define the change in trade structure in each industry over the period from 1978 to 1995 as follows:
(1) where: T = vector of changes in the trade structure, X, M = vectors of export and import values, respectively, and, x, m = vectors of export and import propensities, respectively. Export propensity, for example, is total exports divided by domestic production in the industry. Superscripts refer to the beginning and end years of the period.
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The vector of changes in the trade structure, T, gives the difference between actual export and import levels at the end of the period and hypothetical levels of exports and imports which would have resulted at the end of the period if the sectoral export and import propensities had remained constant over the period. 4 That is, T is the difference between actual net exports at the end of the period and a counterfactual level of net exports, more clearly shown when equation (1) is rewritten as follows:
where: Q = vector of domestic production.
The vector of changes in the trade structure shows the sectoral composition of manufacturing trade growth, and this provides a useful indicator of changes in trade competitiveness by sector in each country. A greater positive (negative) value of an element of this vector, the greater is the increase (decrease) in trade competitiveness over the period.
Trade structure changes can be divided between trade within the OECD and outside the OECD. The ten countries studied are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. In comparing the effects on these countries of OECD and non-OECD trade, the newer members of the OECD (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Mexico, and South Korea) are included among the non-OECD countries. Throughout this study, Germany refers exclusively to the former West Germany or the regions of the former West Germany, except as noted in Tables 1 and 6 and for the 1990s. We define the non-OECD vector of changes in the trade structure analogous to (1):
where the subscript n refers to non-OECD trade and all else is as defined in (1). Trade structure changes within the OECD are defined as the difference between total and non-OECD trade.
The vectors of changes in the trade structure for each of the ten OECD countries in our sample are presented in Table 2 . The data are at the level of 22 manufacturing sectors and are presented with the OECD and non-OECD trade separate. Trade data are from OECD (1998a) and output data from OECD (1998b).
5 On average, our sample countries saw a non-OECD trade position deterioration of $5.6 billion in Textiles and apparel, $3.8 billion in Office and computing machinery, $2.6 billion in Motor vehicles and $2.2 billion in Electrical apparatus, other (Table 2 , last column).
To further our ability to characterize the uneven regional pattern of trade expansion, we calculated the correlation between trade expansion vectors and labour intensity at the level of individual sectors in each country (see Table 3 , upper panel). We use the vertically integrated labour coefficients, defined as V= l(I-A) -1 where l is a vector of direct labour coefficients for the input-output data year, 6 I is the identity matrix and A is the technical coefficients matrix. A negative sign indicates that sectors experiencing negative trade competitiveness are those with higher labour intensity. A positive sign suggests the opposite, that is, higher labour intensity is associated with positive trade competitiveness. The correlations say nothing about a nation's overall balance of trade, only about whether trade performance is better or worse in more or less labour-intensive sectors.
The results reveal what standard trade theory would indicate -that negative trade competitiveness for OECD with non-OECD countries was concentrated in more labour intensive sectors. For non-OECD trade, all coefficients are negative, indicating the higher labour intensity of the sectors experiencing negative trade performance. For OECD trade, half of the correlation coefficients are positive and the average for the ten countries is positive, if just barely, at 0.04. A similar calculation was made using an alternative measure of trade performance, the percentage point change in sectoral net exports relative to output, which yields similar results (Table 3 , lower panel). In sum, these correlations confirm what is commonly thought: that labour-intensive industries in the OECD are subject to competitive pressure from outside the OECD.
It is useful to compare the correlations within and outside the OECD. We define the "labour intensity gap" as the difference in the correlation between trade expansion and labour intensity for OECD and non-OECD trade. A positive difference (i.e. when the correlation between OECD trade expansion and labour intensity is greater than the correlation between non-OECD trade expansion and labour intensity) indicates that the country's more labour-intensive sectors were relatively less competitive with respect to non-OECD trade than OECD trade. This is the case for each of the ten countries in the sample (Table 3 , last column). This reflects the fact that while the sample countries varied in their industry-level competitiveness with respect to other OECD countries, labour-intensive industries in all ten countries are consistently characterized by less competitiveness with respect to non-OECD than OECD trade. To better understand what is driving these results, we consider the percentage point change in sectoral net exports relative to output (Table 4) . For OECD trade, taking a 20 percentage point change as a threshold, the distinctly successful countries and sectors include Australian Shipbuilding and repairing; Canadian Office and computing machinery, Motor vehicles, and Aircraft; Danish Textiles and apparel, Wood products and furniture, Drugs and medicines, Petroleum and coal products, and Motor vehicles; Italian Non-ferrous metals; Japanese Aircraft; and Dutch Textiles and apparel, Wood products and furniture, Office and computing machinery, Motor Vehicles, Aircraft, Professional goods and precision instruments and Jewelry, musical instruments, toys and sporting goods. Countries and sectors that did not perform well in trade with the OECD were Australian Drugs and medicines, Radio, TV and communications equipment, Aircraft, and Professional goods and precision instruments; Canadian Electrical apparatus, other, and Professional goods and precision instruments; Danish Iron and steel and Non-ferrous metals; Italian Petroleum and coal products; Japanese Other transport; and U.K. Jewelry, musical instruments, toys and sporting goods.
For non-OECD trade, trade expansion was characterized by negative performance overall, dominated by the experiences of the U.S., U.K., and Japan. Specific sectors that had the largest negative trade competitiveness were Canadian Textiles and apparel and Office and computing machinery; Dutch Textiles and apparel and Office and computing machinery; and U.S. Textiles and apparel and Office and computing machinery, all above the 20 percentage point threshold. The Jewelry, musical instruments, toys and sporting goods industry also experienced 19 percentage point declines in Australia, Canada and the U.S., as did the Radio, TV and communications equipment industry in Australia and Canada. This list is consistent with the rise in textiles shipments to OECD countries and especially the increased international competitiveness of developing countries in consumer electronics and household products such as toys, both in final goods form and in parts through the expansion of outsourcing and subcontracting.
7 Some industries experienced strongly positive trade performance with respect to the non-OECD. These included Australian Petroleum and coal products and Italian Non-ferrous metals.
Employment effects of trade expansion
The trade expansion vector measures the effect of trade changes on final demand. Total employment gains or losses resulting from the change in the structure of trade are thus given by:
where: L = vector of changes in total employment associated with a change in the structure of world trade, Ê = diagonal matrix of labour coefficients (employment per unit of output), I = identity matrix, A = technical coefficients matrix, and T is the trade expansion vector.
The employment changes for non-OECD trade may then be written as follows:
where the subscript indicates non-OECD only. Subtracting this from the total employment changes from trade expansion gives the employment effect of trade with other OECD countries. The employment effects of trade expansion are summarized in Table 5 , which gives employment change figures in worker-years. Ten country totals show an estimated loss of 3.3 million worker years for world trade using technical and labour coefficients from input-output data year (column 1) and 5.2 million worker years using average technical and labour coefficients for the 1978-1995 period (column 3). This difference results primarily from the greater labour intensity of production (or lower labour productivity) for the period as a whole compared to labour intensity in input-output data years. In general, the use of period average technical and labour coefficients makes no substantive difference in cross-country comparisons and with comparisons of the impact of North-North versus North-South trade, and so the presentation of results focuses on those derived from technical and labour coefficients from input-output data year, consistent with prior factor content studies.
The total employment effects of world trade relative to the counterfactual trade position are largest for the U.S., Japan and the U.K. As a result of world trade an estimated two million worker years were lost in the U.S., 849,000 in Japan, and 651,000 in the U.K. The figure for the U.S. is larger than the 1.2 million found by Sachs and Shatz (1994, p. 7) , but their calculation covered the period 1978 to 1990, while our U.S. sample runs from 1978 to 1995. Leaving aside differences in data and methods, this suggests that between 1990 and 1995, trade expansion resulted in an employment loss of about one million worker-years.
Why are the 1990-1995 U.S. job losses from trade so large? According to the factor content algorithm, for a given baseline of trade and productivity, the employment loss is larger the greater is the expansion of net imports by the end of the period, and the lower is direct labour productivity at the time of measurement. On both these counts, the United States experience was extreme. The U.S. saw the largest net import expansion of any country in the sample, as suggested by Figure 1 , which breaks out the U.S. from the rest of the sample. Moreover, this relatively large trade balance deterioration was heavily concentrated in the most labour-intensive sectors, that is those with the lowest labour productivity. The U.S. Textiles sector, where most of the net import activity took place, has labour productivity of about one-half that of the manufacturing sector as a whole.
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Note that a number of countries had an increase in labour demand as a result of trade. Trade is estimated to have increased employment by 176,000 worker years in the Netherlands, 105,000 in Denmark, 89,000 in Italy and 69,000 in Canada. Germany's trade was largely neutral for employment, with a loss of 15,000 worker years.
A large share of the net employment effects is accounted for by non-OECD trade. For the U.S., non-OECD trade accounted for 1.29 million of the 2.03 million decline. For the U.K. and Japan, the non-OECD share is even higher. And for France and Germany, increases in labour demand from trade with other OECD countries was more than offset by declines in labour demand brought about by trade expansion with non-OECD countries. Table 5 also shows the employment effect as a percentage of the average manufacturing employment for the 1978 to 1980 period. Australia is most negatively affected of the countries in our sample, with labour demand in manufacturing falling by 10.4 percent by this measure. The U.S. decline is 9.9 percent. The U.K. decline was 8.9 percent and for Japan the decline was 6.1. While the results for the U.S. and U.K. are consistent with their well-documented deindustrialization, the figure for Japan is surprising given their well-known export success. Using similar methods, Kucera (1998) found that Japan gained employment from both world and OECD trade for the 1970 to 1991 period, and experienced some losses from non-OECD trade. Results for the 1978 to 1991 period are similar to those for the 1978 to 1995 period, indicating that Japan's negative employment effect is driven by weaker trade performance after the late 1970s.
The big success stories among these countries are Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada, whose trade performance brought job increases of 21.3 and 17.2 and 3.8 percent respectively compared to the level of manufacturing employment in the base period. This may seem surprising in light of the high levels of import penetration in these countries, especially Denmark and the Netherlands (see Table 1 ). The explanation is that import penetration figures alone largely veil the role of trade performance. For each of these three countries, and only these countries among the ten in our study, the export propensities for world trade of manufactures rose more rapidly than import propensities in the 1978 to 1995 period. Table 6 gives the ratio of exports to imports in 1978 and 1995, revealing that only these three countries improved their position. These results are being driven largely by the same sectors that dominated trade expansion, except that more labour-intensive sectors carry more weight when employment effects are considered. Table 7 shows the industry level employment effects of non-OECD trade expansion. More than one-third of the total employment "losses" for all ten countries from non-OECD trade came in the Textiles, apparel, leather and leather goods sector (ISIC 32), with half of this coming
In an earlier study, we found that almost all the "gender bias" in the employment effects of North-South trade resulted from the effects of trade in this (labour intensive and female intensive) sector. See Kucera and Milberg (2000) . in the U.S.
10 Fabricated metal products is the next largest source of employment decline, driven largely by the experiences of Japan, Germany and the U.S. This sector is followed closely by three sectors comprising Electrical products (ISIC 3825, and Rubber and plastic products.
Deindustrialization and trade
Now that we have looked at the absolute and relative employment effects of trade expansion, we turn to the question of how these employment effects relate to the decline in manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, that is, to deindustrialization. From 1978-1995, the average change in the manufacturing share of total employment in the ten OECD countries was 4.3 percentage points. Again, there is considerable variation across countries, with the U.K. and Australia experiencing declines of over 7 percentage points, Germany and Japan with declines of only 2.3 and 1.4 percentage points respectively and Denmark with an increase of 3.3 percentage points (see column 1 of Table 8 ). To measure the relative importance of trade expansion in deindustrialization, we calculated the difference between the employment share with and without trade expansion. That is, following Wood (1994) :
(6) where:
E m = manufacturing employment in 1978-80, T m = estimated change in manufacturing employment from trade expansion (from Table  5 , column 1), and E = total civilian employment in 1978-80. The middle columns of Table 8 give the calculation of R, using technical coefficients and labour coefficients from the input-output data year. In six of the ten countries, world trade contributed to deindustrialization. The change in the manufacturing share of total employment from world trade expansion varied across countries from a positive 5.81 (Denmark) to a negative 3.27 (U.K.) (see Table 8 ).
The picture is more complicated when we break out OECD from non-OECD trade. Trade with OECD countries raised the manufacturing share of employment in more than half the cases. Denmark's manufacturing share of employment was almost 7 percentage points higher because of its trade with other OECD countries. For the Netherlands the contribution of OECD trade was 5.88 percentage points and in Canada 3.26 percentage points. In four cases (Australia, Japan, U.K. and U.S.), expansion of trade with other OECD countries actually contributed to deindustrialization.
Non-OECD trade contributed to deindustrialization in all ten countries, with the largest effects in Canada (-2.45 percentage points) the U.K. (-2.24), the Netherlands (-1.89), and Germany (-1.88), and the smallest effects in Australia (-0.59 percentage points), Italy (-0.62), and France (-1.01).
Thus, while non-OECD trade contributed to job loss for all countries, trade with other OECD countries brought negative employment effects for some countries but not others. This difference in the pattern of competitive performance was seen above in Table 3 , and is revealed again by the larger coefficient of variation in the measures with respect to OECD (1.96) than with non-OECD trade countries (-0.45) (see Table 8 ).
Non-OECD trade is thus an unambiguous contributor to OECD deindustrialization. Overall, however, deindustrialization is more highly correlated with the employment effects of OECD trade. The correlation between the change in the manufacturing employment share from OECD trade expansion and the overall change in manufacturing employment share is 0.59, whereas for non-OECD trade the correlation is 0.12 (see bottom of Table 8 ). These correlations, of course, say nothing about causality. They cannot tell us if trade is endogenous to overall employment patterns or if trade actually causes deindustrialization. They do indicate that trade with other OECD countries reflects overall employment share changes more than does trade with non-OECD countries, even though the net employment losses from trade expansion are dominated by the effects of non-OECD trade. A similar conclusion can be drawn from a correlation of the change in net exports (relative to GDP) (shown in the last three columns of Table 8 ) with changes in the manufacturing share of employment. Once again, OECD trade is much more highly correlated with the change in the manufacturing employment share than non-OECD trade (0.64 versus 0.24). The general pattern of the stronger correlation between deindustrialization and OECD than non-OECD trade is robust with respect to the exclusion of any given country from the sample.
Conclusion
This paper did not take up the question of whether deindustrialization -defined as a decline in the manufacturing share of total employment -is "good" or even a "natural" part of the process of achieving economic maturity. Independent of this issue is the ongoing debate over the significance of international trade, and especially North-South trade, in the deindustrialization of the developed countries. Regression analysis has, depending on the particular sample and model specification, provided support for one side or the other of the argument. Particularly noteworthy is a study by Saeger, which provides credible evidence suggesting the greater importance of non-OECD than OECD trade as a determinant of deindustrialization (Saeger, 1997 ). Saeger's study also uses the OECD STAN data sets but differs from ours in terms of country coverage, method and period. In short, Saeger compares the effect of OECD and non-OECD trade on 22 OECD countries in an econometric analysis of panel data, looking at five-year intervals for the 1970-90 period.
The evidence presented here using factor content analysis for 10 OECD countries for the period 1978-1995 shows that to the extent that trade is a culprit, it is the employment effects of North-North trade that most closely track the overall change in the manufacturing share of employment in each country. The volume of intra-OECD trade greatly exceeded that of non-OECD trade, so it is not surprising that the net effects of intra-OECD trade on aggregate demand are also much more significant than the effects of non-OECD trade. Consistent with this are comparisons of percentage increases with percentage point increases in import penetration from 1978 to 1995, as shown in Table 1 . Canada's 192 per cent increase in non-OECD import penetration constitutes only 2.2 percentage points as compared to the 17 percentage points corresponding to the 56 per cent increase in OECD import penetration. The 175 per cent increase in non-OECD import penetration in the U.S. constitutes only 3.8 percentage points, less than the 5.6 percentage points corresponding to the 89 per cent increase in OECD import penetration. As obvious as this arithmetic is, its importance is sometimes forgotten in the heated discussion of North-South trade.
At the same time, non-OECD trade accounts for most of the net effect of trade expansion on employment. This is because trade with other OECD countries is largely a zero-sum game with respect to employment, while trade with non-OECD countries is associated in every case with employment declines. The reasons for this are numerous, and in this paper we have been able to measure some of these. We have seen that OECD countries on average saw a greater decline in competitiveness vis-à-vis non-OECD countries in relatively more labour intensive sectors, so that a given change in competitiveness has a greater impact on employment.
A second source of employment "losses" from non-OECD trade cannot be identified with factor content calculations, but nonetheless deserves attention. Breaking out trade by region does not allow us to say if the effects are driven by changes in exports or changes in imports. Figure 2 shows exports and imports with non-OECD countries, for the 10-country total. It indicates that, contrary to the popular view, the employment losses from non-OECD trade were not largely the result of surging import penetration from low-wage countries, but instead the result of a decline in exports to these low-income markets especially in the aftermath of the debt crisis in the 1980s.
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Whenever non-OECD imports were rising rapidly -for example during the late 1970s and the early 1990s -exports were growing at a similar rate. The exception to this pattern is the United States (shown in figure 3 ), which not only runs a trade deficit with the non-OECD, but which saw that deficit rise in the 1990-1995 period.
The strong relation between OECD trade and OECD manufacturing employment indicates the need to put the issue of North-South trade into a macroeconomic context. Public concern with the deindustrializing effects of trade, so prominent in the 1980s and early 1990s, largely died out in the late 1990s. This was certainly not due to a slowdown in exports of developing countries to developed country markets during this period. To the contrary, developing countries attained an acceleration of import penetration. But this effect was offset by the long period of economic expansion in the 1990s and especially the impressive growth of employment in the U.S. and U.K. During periods of rapid aggregate demand (and wage) growth in developed countries, low-wage import competition is hardly noticed. It is when aggregate demand growth is slow that low-wage competition from abroad becomes central to policy debates in industrialized countries.
12 Today, with economic downturn well underway in the U.S. and other industrialized countries, the issue of trade and deindustrialization is likely to soon return to the center of policy discussions.
TRADE AND THE LOSS OF MANUFACTURING JOBS IN THE OECD
Appendix: Data Notes
This study makes use of the of the OECD's STAN Structural Analysis databases, the Input-Output Database (1995) for input-output data, the Bilateral Trade Database (1998) for trade data, and the STAN Database for Industrial Analysis (1995 Analysis ( , 1998 for output, total employment, and price deflator data (the last derived from data on value added in real and nominal terms, which are not provided for Australia in the 1998 edition and for which the 1995 edition is used). These data sets have the advantage of being largely standardized by industry classification, following what the OECD calls an "Adjusted ISIC Revision 2 Classification," for which there are 22 distinct manufacturing industries. The classification scheme is shown in Table 2 by both ISIC code and industry description.
The OECD Input-Output Database provides data only on the ten countries considered in this paper. For the bulk of the analysis, input-output data are used for the most recent year available, usually 1990, as noted in Table 5 . For the construction of average technical coefficients for the 1978 to 1995 period, technical coefficients derived from input-output data for the most recent year are averaged with technical coefficients derived from input-output data for the mid-to late-1970s (Australia, 1974; Japan, 1975; Canada, 1976 ; Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and the U. S., 1977; Germany, 1978 , and the U.K., 1979). For Italy, inputoutput data are for 1985 only, and thus no analysis is done using average technical coefficients (only average labour coefficients). For Australia, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, input-output data do not perfectly conform to the "Adjusted ISIC Revision 2 Classification." Thus data from the STAN Database for Industrial Analysis and Bilateral Trade Database are modified to match the input-output data for these countries whenever feasible. For Australia, ISIC 3832 also includes ISIC 3825; for Denmark, ISIC 382-3825 also includes ISIC 3825 and ISIC 3843 also includes 3842+44+49 and 3845; for Germany, ISIC 351+352 also includes ISIC 3522 and ISIC 383-3832 also includes ISIC 3832 (ISIC 3842+44+49 is omitted, as inputoutput data for it is spread among industries in such a way that a correction is not feasible); for the Netherlands, ISIC 371 also includes ISIC 372 and ISIC 383-3832 also includes ISIC 3832).
Regarding the definition of the OECD and non-OECD regions in the Bilateral Trade Database, the data documentation states: "The relatively new OECD member countries (Czech Republic; Hungary, South Korea, Mexico and Poland) are currently included in the Non-OECD" region.
Whenever possible, the analysis uses data from 1978 to 1995. As a result of missing employment and production data, however, the analysis runs only to 1992 for Australia and 1994 for Denmark, Italy, and the U.K. For Germany (that is, the former West Germany), trade data include regions of the former East Germany after 1990, and thus the analysis runs only to 1990. In addition, employment data in Australia for ISIC 3845 run begin in only 1981; employment data in Japan for ISIC 3842+44+49 and ISIC 3825 begin in only 1984. Thus other data for these industries in these two countries is also truncated to match the shorter period. Employment and production data for ISIC 3842+44+49 are missing for all years for Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the U.S.; employment and production data for ISIC 3845 are missing for all years for Denmark. These industries in these countries are thus excluded from the analysis. Industrylevel price deflators are used in the construction of average labour coefficients. Price data are missing for eight of the ten countries for ISIC 3825, Office and Computing Equipment. Thus labour coefficients for the year of the input-output data are used for this industry. -30'421 -210'619 -20'595 -178'099 -427'336 -106'500 -575'397 -83'657 -445'311 -1'290'091 -3'368'025 Sources: OECD STAN Database for Industrial Analysis , 1998; OECD Bilateral Trade Database , 1998; OECD Input-Output Database , 1995. Note: "na" indicates data not available. Notes: E m = manufacturing employment in 1978-80; T m = estimated change in manufacturing employment from trade expansion in worker years (from Table 5 , column 1); E = total civilian employment in 1978-80; X = exports; M = imports; and GDP = gross domestic product. a For France, column (1) refers to the 1978-1993 period as a result of missing data.
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